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CAN THE REAL CITIZEN
STAND UP PLEASE?
THE ELUSIVENESS OF THE CITIZEN
IN THE MIDDLE EAST
"
«They seek him here, they seek him there, those Frenchies seek him everywhere;
Is he in heaven, is he in hell, that damned illusive Pimpernel?»
The Scarlet Pimpernel
roel meijer
This article deals with the debate about citizens-
hip. It discusses Nils A. Butenschøn’s «citizenship
approach» and tries to historicize his theory and
project it back to the nineteenth century and the
interbellum, in an attempt to draw an outline of
the history of citizenship in the Middle East.
Citizenship is an elusive subject and this essay
seeks to demonstrate the usefulness of applying
the term citizenship to the Middle East. The main
reason for raising this question is that scholars of
the Middle East seldom use the term, or if they do,
they do so in a random off-hand way, assuming
that citizenship is an unproblematic concept, such
as in the «citizens of the Ottoman Empire», the
«citizens» of Egypt, or even the «citizens of Qatar»
in an exhibition at Qatar museum on Qatari
workers who supposedly built their country in the
early oil industry in the 1950s. Seldom is the
problematic character of the term citizenship
recognized. Rarely is citizenship itself a topic of
research, and if it is, this is mostly limited to one
aspect of citizenship: nationality (in Arabic
jinsiyya), in the sense of possessing a passport and
being a subject of a state, or in the case of
populations who do not have a fixed
internationally recognized nationality, such as
Palestinians and Kurds and the problematic
character of their nationality. Even scholars who
have given citizenship more thought disagree on
its character. Will Hanley, who recently published
a book on nationality in Alexandria at the end of
the nineteenth century, has a highly legalistic view
of citizenship, and argues that looking for sub-
stantial citizenship in the nineteenth century is
compared to an «impossible quest for a Holy Grail
of indigenous political citizenship that was de-
stroyed by outside forces». He states that «there
was no democratic citizenship» and therefore no
subject to study at the end of nineteenth century
because there were no rights, only duties.1
Elsewhere he refers to citizenship in Alexandria
as the effect of «legal technologies».2 Others, like
Bryan Turner, one of the founders of citizenship
studies in the 1980s, has given more sociological
reasons for its absence in the Middle East,
pointing out that the tenacity of kinship relations
prevented the emergence of individualism, a
precondition of citizenship.3 He finds company in
Middle East specialist Sami Zubaida, who argues
that the social relations in the region are based on
kinship, clan and tribal relations and that the in-
dividual and the notion of rights is not sufficiently
developed.4 On the other extreme, stands Engin
Isin, who holds the opinion that these definitions
of citizenship are too Western and Orientalist. He
argues that citizenship should be based on a
completely different set of criteria. According to
his definition, citizenship already existed during
the premodern Ottoman period. «Ottoman
citizenship» was embodied in the way people or-
ganized, assembled, and differentiated themselves.
These institutions, even more than Western re-
forms of the nineteenth century, have produced
civil consciousness, civility, social responsibility
and forms of identity, solidarity and loyalty that
we associate with citizenship.5 In fact, the process
of centralization, standardization, homogeni-
zation that is part of the Tanzimat reforms only
produced an authoritarian state that ended local,
deeply held notions and practices of citizenship.
Among regional scholars, a comparable argument
is found in Wael Hallaq’s The Impossible State, in
which he argues that modern surveillance states
exclude sharia that buttressed an Islamic civil
society sustained by the ulamā’.6 In the same vein,
Timothy Mitchell in his Colonizing Egypt argues
that modern citizenship leads to a disciplinary re-
gime of state surveillance.7
     During the past decade much work has been
done on notions of citizenship and the application
of citizenship theory to the Middle East, and by
now citizenship has become something of a dis-
cipline that helps us understand the Middle East
in a new way. To these new trends belong the
works of Gianluca Parolin,8 Lauren Banco,9
Michelle Campos,10 Elizabeth Thompson11 and
Rania Maktabi.12 Their main success has been to
retrieve citizenship as a subject from being
crushed between the anvil of the «soft» approach
that has attracted most scholarly attention such as
Arab nationalism and its heavy emphasis on iden-
tity, and the anvil of «hard», realist, political
science theories of authoritarian state resilience
theories. There are also many studies that have
indirectly contributed to the understanding of
citizenship. To these belong, for example, recent
works on sectarianism,13 the Ottoman empire,14
Muslim-Christian relations,15 studies on guilds,16
and all studies on workers and trade unions in the
twentieth century Egypt.17 Reading these works
through the lens of citizenship, one is struck by
the proverbial elephant in the room. This is not
surprising as the larger project of which citizens
played a part was to build a new civic and political
order in which citizenship was the central feature,
even if it is not named as such. The end result is a
new reading of Middle Eastern history.   
     Nils A. Butenschøn’s Citizenship and the State
in the Middle East: Approaches and Applications
published in 2000,18 together with its companion,
edited by Suad Joseph on gender and citizenship,19
belong to the first publications on the Middle East
focusing on the concept of citizenship. Buten-
schøn’s introduction to his anthology is the first
attempt to theorize what he calls the «citizenship
approach», and in many ways it is still valid. He
argues that citizenship is the «organizing principle
of state-society relations in modern states. It draws
lines between members and nonmembers, be-
tween those who are included and those excluded
from specific rights and obligations regulated by
the authorities».20 Essentially this is a function of
the state through its «politics of citizenship». The
state provides for the right of abode (jinsiyya), or
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nationality as well as the right of «equal access to
the civil, political, social, and economic resources
of the state»,21 or muwātana, in the case of
democratic citizenship. Importantly, Butenschøn
calls the relationship between state and citizen a
social contract. This allows him to come to his
main point that the crisis of the Middle East can
be traced to «the lack of trust of the citizen in the
state». In the second half of his introduction he
defines different models of citizenship – what we
have called «citizenship regimes» in the first
anthology Nils A. Butenschøn and I edited in
201722 – dividing the Middle East into singular and
pluralistic regimes, with the first including Saudi
Arabia, Turkey, and the second Lebanon. A third
category, universalism, does not occur in the
Middle East, but seems to be a future ideal, except
perhaps Tunisia after 2011. Butenschøn’s analysis
focuses mainly on the period after independence
and the crisis of legitimacy of the authoritarian re-
gimes in the 1980s. He takes into account the
different forms of citizenship due to local circum-
stances and social formations, but his is essentially
an ahistorical analysis. It focuses mainly on the
authoritarian state and not on the agency of the
people (demos), or social movements. Nor does he
look at ideas and their role in the historical for-
mation of citizenship in contestation with the
state. What he does do, however, is provide the
building blocks of the analysis of citizenship (the
role of the state, state-citizen relations, social
contract between state and citizen and legitimacy,
collective or individual citizenship, tension be-
tween jinsiyya and muwātana).  
     These building blocks are essential in tracing
the development of the citizen in the Middle East.
They raise questions about the period when the
modern state arose, which form it adopted, and
which power mechanisms it developed and to
what extent it became sovereign and gained full
control over its subjects, turning them into
citizens through legal procedures. It addresses the
issue of inclusion and exclusion. The same applies
to citizenship. When did a modern citizen arise
and when did the transition take place from sub-
ject to citizen? This is not just the result of the rise
of the modern state and its control mechanisms
of individuals, because for a notion of citizenship
to take hold, citizens must not only become aware
of their duties to the state, but also of their rights,
developing allegiances to larger political
communities, and develop a sense of the common
good. In Benedict Anderson’s words, citizenship
is an «imagined community», but it is also
concrete in the sense that it relates to how it is ex-
pressed, organizes itself and produces certain
practices. As such, citizenship is not just imposed
by the state but is also constituted through
participation and mobilization of social move-
ments. More than in Europe, in the Middle East
this has been a messy business, with partial
successes, and more downs than ups. Citizenship
has been diverse, highly differentiated, sometimes
even disappearing, producing the so-called
«child-citizen» under Hazfez al-Asad,23 or the
noncitizen under Saddam Hussein.24 Another
difference with Western Europe is the tremendous
influence of foreign interference in development
of citizenship in the Middle East. Foreign
intervention and incorporation into the periphery
of the world economic system has severely
hampered sovereignty of the state and its capacity
to acquire control over its population and im-
plement a program of «citizenization». Because of
privileges, trade arrangements and extraterritorial
roel meijer
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Investigating citizenship in the region is
investigating the deeper reasons for the
present crisis.
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rights granted to specific groups, individuals, and
religious minorities allied with European powers,
many potential citizens redirected their loyalty to
foreign powers, and had a complex, ambiguous
relation with their own emerging state. Despite
these caveats, it would be unwise not to look at
these developments and only associate citizenship
with complete sovereignty and the formation of
the social contract of post-independence between
state and people as this would neglect the previous
Ottoman and colonial social contracts, or citizens-
hip regimes. In fact, the authoritarian regimes and
their so-called «ruling bargain» or «populist-
nationalist bargain» with the population cannot
be understood properly without considering the
previous citizenship regimes to which they were a
reaction. One of the major advantages of the
citizenship approach is to trace the development
of concepts and practices of citizenship over a long
period of time and study the transitions in
citizenship regimes. As Nils A. Butenschøn and I
argue in our two anthologies, investigating
citizenship in the region is investigating the
deeper reasons for the present crisis.25
     In the remainder of this article I will look at
three developments that shed light on citizenship
before independence of Arab states in the 1950s.  
TANZIMAT AND THE MODERN OTTOMAN STATE
One of the main issues of the nineteenth century
is the rise of the modern state and its impact on
the population and the transformation of subjects
into citizens based on a new social contract.
According to the classical Ottoman social contract
the sultan provided protection of the Dar Islam,
upheld the sharia, implemented justice and
maintained the peace to ensure the prosperity of
his subjects. In practice the power of the state
remained limited; it was strongly decentralized,
and only maintained indirect relations with the
populations through intermediaries of local
notables, guild and tribal sheikhs, and the
military, who collected taxes for the state and kept
part of the revenue for themselves. A separate
contract was made with non-Muslims, which
went back to the so-called contract of the second
rightly guided caliph Umar. According to the pact,
non-Muslims were protected in exchange for
loyalty to the sultan and the payment of an extra
tax, the jizya.26 In terms of citizenship, Muslims
were privileged, non-Muslims were secondary
citizens. But as Baki Tezcan argues both Muslims
and non-Muslims belonged to the «flock» (reaya),
and were treated the same and had to pay taxes.
The real difference was between on the one hand
the elite (khaa), the sultan, his servants (who were
regarded as his slaves and could be dispossessed),
the ulamā’, and on the other hand, the masses
(‘amma).27
     The Tanzimat (1839–1876) changed this
traditional order. The main difference is that the
state was completely reorganized, acquired
unprecedented power and started to directly
interfere in the lives of the population, not only
through increased taxation but also through more
detailed regulations and other control me-
chanisms. The increase in power is also
exemplified in the introduction of conscription
and a standing army in the 1830s, which replaced
the Janissaries who were slaughtered by Mahmud
ii in 1826. By 1881 the army had increased to
300.000 troops.28 No less dramatic for the spread
of the notion of modern citizenship was the
attempt to introduce equality between Muslims,
Jews and Christians in the two edicts, those of
1839 and 1856. The intention was to gain the
loyalty of Christians and Jews – still 40 percent of
the population – to the Ottoman state on the basis
of a new social contract, called Ottomanism (Os-
manlilik).29 In theory, this contract created equal
citizenship. The earlier abolition of clothing laws
and termination of the sartorial differences be-
can the real citizen stand up please?
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tween adherents of different religions was also an
important measure that enhanced equality.30
     The Ottoman attempt to create equal citizens-
hip was, however, not an undivided success. Much
depended on the capacity of the centralized
empirical state to acquire sovereignty, but
throughout the nineteenth century its power over
its own territory and population was undermined.
First through military defeats, ending in the
Balkan wars of 1912–1913, when the Ottoman state
lost almost all of its territory in Europe. Second,
through the expansion of the Capitulations, for-
eign powers acquired greater influence over
crucial sections of the population by giving them
the status of foreign protégés. As a result, the richer
members of the empire fell under foreign law and
were exempt from paying taxes. While at first the
status of protégés were limited to the dragomans,
protégé status was extended to family members,
other merchants, and later whole Christian
communities. This was a universal development
in the Middle East and North Africa. At a certain
point even members of the makhzen in Morocco
and the cabinet of Khedive Tawfiq in Egypt were
foreign protégés. By the end of the century, large
sections of new cosmopolitan cities such as
Salonica, Smyrna, Beirut and Alexandria, which
were the centers of economic activity, fell under
consular control. In some cases, their
municipalities were run by a foreign council. In
these circumstances, many Christians who grew
wealthy in trade with Europe were unwilling to
risk their lives for the Ottoman Empire and paid
an exemption tax for conscription (bedel askeri).
Missionary schooling for Christians as well as
Jews (through the Alliance Israélite universelle)
which presented a European curriculum in Eu-
ropean languages further undermined the effort
to create equal citizenship by the state. The result
was an increasing division among the population.
While on the one hand the Muslim population
increasingly attended public schooling, which
after the end of the Tanzimat period became
increasingly Islamically oriented, and were
recruited into the army. On the other hand
minorities attended missionary schools, became
culturally and politically focused on Europe and
were exempt from military service and taxes.  
     Despite these divisions, the introduction of
citizenship was not a failure everywhere. Recent
research has demonstrated that the impact of
Arab nationalism and the support for Arab
independence has been greatly exaggerated and
that by and large the populations of what later be-
came Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Palestine – even
minorities – remained loyal to the Ottoman
empire until the First World War and even
afterwards precisely for the reason that they felt
they were citizens of the Empire.31 In her study of
the responses in Palestine to the Young Turk
Revolution, Michelle Campos demonstrates that
cross-ideological, cross-ethnic and non-sectarian
notions of a common citizenship were alive and
kicking. Christians, Jews and Muslims welcomed
the re-installment of the 1876 constitution and
sent candidates to the parliament in Istanbul,
participated in the boycott of foreign powers
during the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913, and
demonstrated a new common civil awareness and
responsibility.32 The First World ended this
solidarity, partly because of Turkification but
mainly because the Ottoman empire was defeated
and territories were divided among French,
British and Italian colonial powers. 
     Citizenship rather than just nationalism and
identity politics also explains the emergence of
Turkey as a nation-state after the defeat of the
Ottoman Empire. It was the regime Atatürk
imposed in the 1920s establishing complete
roel meijer
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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sovereignty, laying down rigorous boundaries,
ending the Capitulations and foreign privilege,
which produced a completely new citizenship re-
gime based on the exclusion of non-Muslims, the
integration the millions of refugees and the
religious, cultural linguistic homogenization of
the population that explains his success.33
EGYPT BEFORE THE FIRST WORLD WAR
Egypt’s trajectory of citizenship was completely
different from the Ottoman Empire, even if it for-
mally was part of the empire until the
proclamation of the British protectorate in 1914.
Research on related topics of citizenship highlight
four aspects that determined – often in
contradictory ways – Egyptian citizenship regime
in the nineteenth and early twentieth century: the
bureaucratic unification of the country, the
development of a public sphere, the rise of
Egyptian proto-nationalism, and the economic
incorporation into the modern world system.   
     Egypt in the nineteenth century was in many
ways more successful in building national unity
than the Ottoman Empire. With a much smaller
population and territory, it was much easier for
Mehmed Ali (1808–1848) to control the country
and build a conscription army consisting of the
Egyptian peasantry (fellahin). However, this army
hardly contributed to nation-building during his
lifetime as it was largely a dynastic army and not
a nationalist army mobilized to defend the
nation.34 More importantly, in the long run, was
Mehmed Ali’s success in building a centralized
state which his successors expanded. Rapid
urbanization, and the modernization of
communication (roads, canals, telegraph,
railroads) further enhanced the unification of the
country. Since the 1870s cultural development
caught up and salons, clubs (masonic lodges),
coffee houses, new theatres, and popular music
helped to produce a sense of national unity and a
common public sphere. Ziad Fahmy in his book
on early notions of nationalism, demonstrates not
only that new ideas on Egyptian identity and
rights should be regarded as «proto-nationalism»,
but that the emergence of a «national public opi-
nion» was not just limited to the elite but spread
to the lower classes through the development of
Egyptian colloquial newspapers and pamphlets
and popular culture.35 The result was the beginn-
ing of what can be called modern citizenship. An
alliance the Egyptian new middle class of effendis
and village sheikhs and lower classes demanded
economic, social and economic rights that trans-
cended particular interests and promoted the
common good. Fahmy demonstrates that justice
had always been an essential element in Islam, but
the idea that the people had rights laid down in a
constitution, could hold rulers accountable, and
represent themselves politically, was something
completely new. To be sure, the modern
terminology for citizen (muwatin) was rarely
used, but intellectuals and the population used
other terms that had a comparable meaning.
Traditional terms such as «son/daughter of the
land» (ibn/bint al-balad), the people (sha‘b, ahali),
commoners (‘amma) acquired new meanings in a
new context of changing state-citizen relations.
They implied entitlements of individuals to civil
rights (justice), the right to livelihood and
economic claims (rightful income, reasonable
level of taxes, spending money on the welfare of
the common good instead of paying off the
national debt to foreigners), and political rights
(representation).36 The emergence of a modern
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notion of citizenship that developed in relations-
hip the modern state is confirmed by John
Chalcraft who recognizes that the petitions of the
guild members reflect «a kind of kernel of
citizenship».37 In return for the increased
regulatory role and discipline (al-dabt wa-l-rabt)
of the modern state and the imposition of higher
taxes,38 guild members gained the right to elect
their shaykhs and appeal against corruption and
illegal collection of taxes to local courts.39 The
«wish of people» (raghbat al-sha‘b) as legitimating
principle became commonly accepted.40
     At the same time countervailing tendencies be-
came preponderant.41 Chalcraft points out three
reasons which led to the decline of even this trend
toward citizenship. The first is the termination of
the alliance between effendiyya and the lower
classes of the guilds during the Urabi revolution;
the second is the dismantlement of the guilds
themselves and the establishment of unmitigated
relations of former guild members and the state.
The third reason was, however, decisive: the
expansion of peripheral capitalism under British
colonialism, which led to «labor squeezing» and
the reduction of wages to subsistence level, or
even lower. In the absence of any intermediary or
organization to defend the rights to livelihood of
guild members, its members resorted to «self-
exploitation» in competition among each other.
Ironically, Chalcraft argues, the fact that the work-
ing class did not pay taxes under the British, who
had gradually abolished them, left them without
political leverage. The British realized that
unreasonably high taxes under khedive Ismail had
led to political upheaval. By shifting the tax
burden from direct taxes to the export sector
(land tax and customs) they had been demobilized
and could not make demands for social legis-
lation, welfare, educational facilities and training.
From other measures, such as education, it is clear
that the British actively undermined the trend
towards citizenship rights.42 The British citizen-
ship regime was based on the colonial bargain be-
tween British authorities and the khedive and
(after 1923 the king), large landowners, and those
involved in the export economy of cotton. It was
only when nationalism picked up after the Dins-
hway incident in 1905 (the unfair hanging of
Egyptians peasants) and the nationalist movement
regained interest in the working class and es-
tablished training centers for it that a new
coalition was built and strikes and other forms of
protest were organized to defend economic rights,
inaugurating a new phase in the development of
citizenship.
SYRIA BEFORE THE UNIFICATION WITH EGYPT
Syria during the mandate period and before the
unification with Egypt in 1958, provides another
example in which citizenship approach can make
a difference. Syrian history in this period is usually
portrayed as an instable, artificial country, carved
out of the Ottoman Empire by the Sykes-Picot
Treaty. The heart of the continuous political crisis
Syria was prone to is sought in the lack of a central
identity.43 This is most pointedly expressed in the
question whether it should merge with Iraq, join
King Abdallah’s Greater Syria project, or unite
with Egypt. From a citizenship perspective, iden-
tity can only be part of the story and is important
insofar it produces a stable or viable citizenship
regime. Elisabeth Thompson makes clear why
efforts to create common citizenship failed. An
interesting attempt was to create equal citizenship
by the mandate authorities through the
emancipation of the peasants along the lines of
what had happened in France.44 The purpose was
to create a popular base for colonial rule and sub-
vert the Sunni large landowners. These reforms
were abandoned after the Great revolt of 1925
when the French had no choice but to work
through the notable Sunni families. Lack of
can the real citizen stand up please?
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financial means led to indirect rule and under-
mined the nation-building process.45 Like in
Egypt, the colonial bargain shored up a class
system of unequal, differentiated citizenship –
basically excluding the rural population and
granting special privileges to the notable class of
large landowners and merchants (‘ayān, dhawāt).
For the same reason the French colonial
authorities sought separate alliances with
religious, especially Christian leaders, channeling
considerable state funds for education through
missionary schools. Public schools, the Tajhīz, did
emerge to educate the sons of the middle classes,
but only gradually. Common citizenship was
further undermined by the promotion of ethnic
and religious divisions by creating autonomous
statelets of Alawites in the north-west, the Druze
in the south and an autonomous region of Jazira
in the north-east, as well as promoting religious
communalism.46 Finally, the French prevented a
democratic political system from emerging be-
cause independence would damage the economic
interests of a small interest group who had invest-
ments in Syria, the parti colonial. Constantly
interfering in the political process and blocking
the nationalist movement such as the National
Block from gaining support, the French mandate
produced a highly instable political system of op-
portunistic politicians whose power was based on
patronage and clientelism instead of mass
mobilization of the broader population. Patrick
Seale has masterfully analyzed the consequences
of this policy; how during the period between the
Second World War and the unification with Egypt
in 1958, local, regional and international players
collaborated in undermining the sovereignty of
the state which Syrians had formally obtained
after independence in 1946. Constantly shifting
coalitions between Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Iraq
pitted corrupt politicians, who represented
regional, religious, personal and class interests,
against each other, splitting the society apart.47 He
points out that the Ba‘ath – or for that matter the
Ahālī group in Iraq,48 or the Society of National
Renaissance in Egypt49 – were more successful
than the older «feudalist» politicians in bringing
about a new citizenship regime based on land re-
forms, industrialization, workers’ rights, and mass
education. They failed, however, because they
allied themselves with authoritarian military re-
gimes, which in the end revived the regime of
differential citizenship and partial bargains, with
religious, economic, social interest groups.  
CONTRIBUTION
In what way do these three examples illustrate the
contribution citizenship approach can make to
Middle Eastern studies and a reinterpretation of
Middle Eastern history?50
     First, the formation of modern citizenship in
the Middle East and North Africa is a continuous
historical process that developed since the beginn-
ing of the emergence of the modern state and the
evolution of completely different relations with its
subjects since the beginning of the nineteenth
century. This was an administrative and political
development that occurred in response to the
Western military and economic challenges to state
sovereignty. The three examples show that
citizenship and its vagaries are central to
modernity in the Middle East. It is an essential
factor in the concept of Ottomanism, it played a
crucial role during the Urabi revolution of 1881–
1882 and the emergence at the end of the
nineteenth century of the public sphere and the
rise of the proto-nationalist movement, which
used a discourse of rights and changed the content
of traditional terms to denote the commoners. In
the interbellum it captures the specific character
of the colonial bargain, and how the French in
Mandate Syria failed to create a viable citizenship
regime that would sustain a stable political system
roel meijer
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after independence. Rather than focusing on iden-
tity politics and pan-Arabism, research should
acquire a sensitivity to look for new relations of
citizenship developed by guilds, peasants, the
working class and the new middle class
(effendiyya) and efforts to develop concepts of a
more viable, egalitarian citizenship regime to sup-
plant the colonial bargain. Modern Middle Eas-
tern history in this sense can be seen as a
continuous attempt to come to grips with the
changing state-citizen relations through devising
new concepts as well as new practices of citizen-
ship. This applies even to its latest manifestation,
the Islamic State, where assertions of new forms
of membership in Islamic political communities
emerged under rebel governance.51 It is much
more fruitful to regard the Islamic State as another
attempt to create a viable citizenship regime of an
exclusive Sunni nation-state in response to
sectarian, pro-Shi‘i politics of Nouri al-Maliki
(Vice President and Prime Minister between
2006–2014) than trying to explain its rise in Is-
lamic terms as an authentic caliphate.  
     Second, the citizenship approach is a focal
point which integrates different developments that
are otherwise seen as separate. Citizenship, or
rather differentiated citizenship, shows how
relationship developed depending on local
circumstances such as the existence of the Millet
system, foreign interference, and the integration
into the capitalist system. Citizenship is therefore
a reflection of not just administrative regulation,
standardization, and the increasing extractive
capacity of the state, it is also influenced by in-
tegration of the region into the world economy,
Islamic responses to that integration, and changes
in identity formation. For instance, it is clear that
the power of European countries demanded
privileges and spread protégé status, and under-
mined sovereignty that is the precondition for
citizenship. At the same time, the expansion /
diffusion of peripheral capitalism and the «self-
exploitation» of workers can be seen as (is) part of
a process of economic inclusion but also of po-
litical exclusion. Citizenship also integrates
different disciplines that have focused on very
specific topics such Arab nationalism, the
resilience of the authoritarian state, civil society,
and social movement theory.  
     Third, in the words of Nyer, citizenship
addresses the quintessential political.52 It analyzes
how power affects citizens and how citizens can
claim political space, contest the power of the state
and create their own communities and defend
their interests. Asking what the implications are
for citizenship rights, notions and concepts of
citizenship, immediately takes the political into
account and analyzes the mechanisms of inclusion
and exclusion, the forms of solidarity, and the level
of active and passive citizenship. 
     Finally, the fear of imposing Western notions
of citizenship is somewhat exaggerated. Citizen-
ship studies is not the study of «cluster of absences
or presences«,53 or «looking for the Holy Grail».
Partly because citizenship is a ‘natural’
development of state-citizen relations in the
modern era in which the state had become the
central focus of claims, and because research has
to be attuned what people themselves say.
Research from Ussama Maqdisi to John Chalcraft
has shown that the terms of ahali, sha‘b have
meant different things and have increasingly
acquired meaning that is akin to citizenship and
a rights discourse. This applies to the nineteenth
can the real citizen stand up please?
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century, but is also obvious in the ideology of the
Ba‘ath, and can also be discerned in the ideology
of the Islamic movement. 
     It is quite possible to reconstruct premodern
notions of citizenship, but they are very different
from the modern one as the state was different.  
     Although the introduction of Nils A. Buten-
schøn does not cover the many aspects of citizens-
hip in the Middle East, he has laid the
groundwork for future study of citizenship in the
region. Hopefully, it will not remain restricted to
an «approach» but will develop into a discipline
in itself by integrating many of the works already
done and incorporating and reanalyzing the exis-
ting literature, as well as promote new research. In
sum, citizenship might seem illusive and spread
between «here» and «there» but in fact looking
more carefully, it is «everywhere».
• ƒ •
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